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Introduction 
With many scholars focusing on the battles that 
took place in Europe and the Pacific during World War 
II, little has been written about the policies employed 
by the United States in Latin America between 1940 and 
1946. The bulk of the material published on Inter-
American relations during the war years has focused on 
Allied counterespionage efforts and on the effects of 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Good Neighbor" 
policies. 1 As a "Good Neighbor" to the Latin American 
Republics, the United States would oppose armed 
intervention into the region by any power and intervene 
itself only when asked by a Latin American Republic to 
do so. 
World War II would change this policy. As European 
fascism grew and spawned conflict, so too did American 
fear that this violent political system would migrate to 
the unstable countries south of the United States. In 
his book, Pawns in a Triangle of Hate: The Peruvian 
1 The term "Good Neighbor" refers to a policy employed 
by the Roosevelt Administration in the 1930's. This new 
policy, offered by the United States to the Latin American 
Republics, was one of friendly assistance - a significant 
change from the interventionist policies the United States 
had employed in the region for the previous forty or more 
years. 
1 
and the United States, Harvey Gardiner uncovered one of the 
targets of American counterespionage in Latin America 
during World War II - Japanese civilians. 2 
Thousands of innocent Japanese families were arrested 
and deported either to the United States or directly to 
Japan for fear that they might attempt to sabotage the 
Allied war effort in the Western Hemisphere. The Japanese 
sent to the United States awaited an uncertain fate in 
dusty, poorly equipped internment camps scattered 
throughout the south and southwest. According to Gardiner, 
American officials urged the Peruvian government to control 
its population of Japanese nationals by arresting them and 
then, once they were in custody in either Peru or the 
United States, used them in personnel exchanges with the 
Japanese government. 
But what of the German and Italian nationals living in 
countries south of the Rio Grande? This thesis is the 
author's attempt to locate the origins of the policies 
employed by the United States during World War II to 
control, through confinement and deportation, German 
nationals living in Latin America. It also recounts the 
difficulties that several German nationals faced at the 
2 C. Harvey Gardiner, Pawns in a Triangle of Hate: The 
Peruvian Japanese and the United States (Seattle, 1981). 
2 
hands of a somewhat intransigent but entirely apathetic 
United States government. The thrust for concern about the 
German nationals living in Latin America came from certain 
officials in President Roosevelt's Administration who 
worried that there would be an increased sense of 
nationalism among this group. They concluded that German 
nationals would become increasingly hostile toward the 
United States should it enter the war on the side of the 
Allies. Administration officials, such as Assistant 
Secretary of State Adolf Berle, strongly believed that the 
heightened hostility from Axis nationals could take many 
forms - anything from subversion to sabotage. 
To repulse such efforts, Berle and other State 
Department officials with close ties to the White House 
initiated a security program designed ostensibly to aid the 
Latin American Republics in their efforts to secure their 
governments from the Axis national, resident threat. But 
the program, initiated and run by overzealous intelligence 
officers and phlegmatic bureaucrats, eventually turned into 
a massive trade in human goods. 
Evidence of the program and its effects are outlined 
in the only published material on the subject - Harvey 
Strum's, "Jewish Internees in the American South, 1942-
3 
1945". 3 This short article written for the American Jewish 
Archives, contains copious information gleaned from the 
Joseph Chamberlain and Cecilia Razovsky Papers collected at 
the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research. Strum follows a 
group of German Jews who were arrested in Panama, interned 
in the United States, and eventually released. Although 
Strum deserves praise for his investigation into a 
heretofore unknown topic, he fails to discuss the origins 
of the policy. 
The group of Jews arrested in Panama, whom Strum 
follows throughout their captivity, were arrested because 
they were German. Their Jewishness would not have been a 
factor had they not been from an Axis allied state. 
Panamanian government officials knew they could arrest 
German nationals with American approval and support. The 
fact that the German Jewish nationals were frequently 
business owners, landed or wealthy simply made them the 
most attractive targets. Thus, it was Panamanian 
opportunism and not American anti-Semitism that placed 
German Jews living in Panama in internment camps. 
3 Harvey Strum, "Jewish Internees in the American 
South, 1942-1945," American Jewish Archives (Spring/Summer, 
1990) . 
4 
5 
Similarly, Strum concludes that anti-Semitic officials 
in the Roosevelt Administration may have undermined efforts 
to free the Jewish internees once they arrived in the 
United States. There is clear evidence that there were 
anti-Semitic elements in the Roosevelt Administration; 
however, they were silenced by the strong efforts of other 
Roosevelt Administration officials, Treasury Secretary 
Henry Morgenthau, Jr. for example, who were determined to 
aid the Jewish internees. 
Nevertheless, it was not Harvey Strum's article in 
American Jewish Archives that sparked the investigation 
behind this thesis. In November, 1994 the National 
Broadcasting Company aired a story entitled "Roundup", 
during an episode of its investigative program Dateline 
NBC. The story focused on two of the men who were among 
the Germans arrested in Latin America and subsequently 
interned in the United States. 4 The program concluded that 
the plot to arrest and deport the Germans and German Jews 
was directed by General George C. Marshall, then United 
States Army Chief of Staff. Additionally, the program's 
producers speculated that among the Germans repatriated 
4 
"Roundup", Dateline NBC, prod. Christopher Scholl, 
National Broadcasting Company, November 30, 1994. 
during the war there were Jews who may have been sent to 
their deaths at the hands of the German government. 
The severity and obscurity of these charges demanded 
further investigation. After a careful review of the 
program transcript and the Strum article, it was apparent 
that a formal investigation of the United States 
involvement in the internment-repatriation program was 
needed. One book, the aforementioned Pawns in a Triangle 
of Hate, helped to focus the search for documentary 
evidence. Harvey Gardiner's painstaking, scholarly study 
gives a true depiction of not only what happened to the 
Japanese in Peru during the war years but also what 
h~ppened to "Good Neighborship". However, Gardiner's study 
was limited to Peru. This narrow scope suggested that a 
close review of documentary evidence from the other Latin 
American Republics might reveal more information. Further, 
it seemed necessary to review the documentary evidence used 
by Dateline NBC resulting in its charges against General 
Marshall. 
After many hours of research reviewing the documents 
at three branches of the National Archives in and around 
Washington, D.C. and at the George C. Marshall Library in 
Lexington, Virginia, there is no evidence that General 
6 
Marshall created the arrest and internment program. Nor is 
there any concrete evidence that any Jews were deported to 
Germany during the war. However, there is some 
circumstantial evidence to support the latter claim. 
The documents used by Dateline indicate that General 
Marshall was involved but do not show that he had influence 
at the policy-forming level. They also show that there is 
only circumstantial evidence that some Jews were exchanged 
during the war. This evidence comes from the passenger 
lists of two ships, the Gripsholm and Drottningholm, which 
were used to repatriate Axis national during the war. On 
the lists are several families from Latin America with 
typically Jewish surnames. 5 These lists are the only 
evidence that Jews were exchanged and fail to prove 
conclusively that the internees were in fact Jewish. 
However, some of these internees' records, like many 
others, were absent from the State Department's Special War 
Problems Division files, where much of the internees' 
5 The names of Axis nationals on repatriation lists 
were reviewed by Mr. James Steincamp, Director of the 
HaMerkaz/Community Resource Center (Richmond, Virginia), to 
determine the possible ancestry of the families. Although 
Mr. Steincamp could not determine if the families were in 
fact Jewish, he did agree that some of the names of 
families, like Rosenbaum and Koch, could be Jewish in 
lineage. 
7 
personal information for this thesis was found. This made 
it nearly impossible to determine many of the internees' 
ancestry. 
But what was found among the thousands of unorganized 
telegrams and dispatches produced by the United States Army 
and State Department during World War II reveals the 
origins and effects of a little known episode in United 
States foreign policy. 
8 
CHAPTER I: A HEMISPHERE IN DANGER? 
By December 1938, Nazi Germany had become a threat to 
the security and peace of Europe. Hitler stood unopposed 
as Britain, under the guidance of Neville Chamberlain, 
appeased German expansionism by allowing the Abwehr to 
occupy the Sudetenland. American President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt was worried that a rearmed and embittered 
Germany would call on its military to resolve its 
territorial disputes. In an attempt to prevent the 
outbreak of yet another European war, Roosevelt appealed 
to both Hitler and Mussolini to settle problems with their 
neighbors amicably. 1 
President Roosevelt's appeal was intended not only to 
prevent war, but also to halt the spread of fascism. With 
the Spanish government under attack by the fascist 
Francisco Franco, it looked as though a plague had spread 
across Europe all the while getting closer to the New 
World. President Roosevelt and officials in the State 
Department saw this westward progression and moved to 
secure the Western hemisphere from the fascist threat. 
1 Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and P..merican 
Foreign Policy, 1933-1945 (New York, 1979), 185, 166; 
Raymond J. Sontag, A Broken World (New York, 1972), 341-
347. 
9 
Latin America was the most vulnerable region in the 
hemisphere. Its governments were weak economically, 
militarily, and politically and at least two employed 
officials who held fascist beliefs. 2 Thus, what communism 
was in Latin America during the 1980's, fascism was in the 
1930's. President Roosevelt saw it as a menace to 
10 
democracy in the New World and in an address to the Western 
hemisphere pledged that 
we are determined to use our energies and 
our resources to counteract and repel the 
foreign plots and propaganda--the whole 
technique of underground warfare originating 
in Europe and now clearly directed against 
all the republics on this side of the 
ocean. 3 
Ultimately, he feared that Germany would attempt to gain 
control of Latin-American states through a system of 
economic and political subversion culminating in an attempt 
to gain control of the entire hemisphere. Thus, not only 
was Latin America in danger; so too was the United States. 4 
2 Gardiner, Pawns in a Triangle of Hate, 39: Walter 
LaFeber, The Panama Canal: The Crisis in Historical 
Perspective (New York, 1989), 72-81. 
3 Address by the President to the Western hemisphere, 
12 October 1940, Department of State Bulletin (Washington, 
1973), 292. 
4 Adolf Berle, Latin America - Diplomacy and Reality 
l 
I 
11 
In order to conquer the New World, the Nazis would call 
upon German nationals living in the region to influence the 
economic or political structure of their adopted countries. 
President Roosevelt and the State Department thought these 
groups carried the seeds of subversion: they had to be 
contained. Although President Roosevelt was deeply 
concerned about the threat these individuals posed to the 
hemisphere, he delegated the task of containing the German 
population in Latin America, and the fascist threat it 
embodied, to his State Department staff. 
Led by Secretary Cordell Hull and Undersecretary 
Sumner Welles, the State Department staff understood 
President Roosevelt's concerns and agreed that Germany 
would have to perform a campaign of economic and political 
subversion prior to establishing a military presence in 
Latin America. 5 Hull and Welles also thought that once a 
country had fallen under the control of the Nazi regime, 
either economically or politically, it could become a place 
for Hitler to stockpile arms and build airfields for 
(New York, 1962), 77; Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt 
and American Foreign Policy, 1933-1945 (New York, 1979), 
233-236. 
s Leslie Rout and John Bratzel, The Shadow War: German 
Espionage and United States Counterespionage in Latin 
America during World War II (Frederick, 1986), 25-52. 
12 
attacks on the Panama Canal or the United States. With 
this in mind, they formulated some unusually extreme 
policies to secure the hemisphere from Axis penetration, 
policies that marked the beginning of the end of the spirit 
of Good Neighborship. Of these policies, the most 
stringent involved the German, Italian, and Japanese 
nationals living in Latin America. 
With their distinct appearance, the Japanese were easy 
to identify and therefore less worrisome to the State 
Department; the Italians and Germans, however, had 
assimilated much more easily into Latin American culture 
and in many cases had intermarried with the indigenous 
population, eventually acquiring wealth and status. This 
made them harder to distinguish and potentially dangerous. 
But, to a much greater degree than the Italians, the 
Germans had retained more of their native culture and had 
even set up German schools in the communities in which they 
lived. 6 Since they had assimilated and had also attempted 
6 Alton Frye, Nazi Germany and the American 
Hemisphere, 1933-41 (New Haven and London, 1967), 67,77. 
German schools throughout Central and South America had 
strong connections to the Father Land and often received 
financial aid from the German government. In fact, by 
1935, Brazil had 1260 German schools within its borders. 
Costa Rica and Guatemala had the greatest number of schools 
in Central America with their combined enrollment level at 
over 500 children. 
13 
to preserve much of their own culture, the German nationals 
posed the most serious threat to the region. 
There were three obvious reasons the State Department 
feared the German population in Latin America. Primarily, 
the many well-established German businesses posed the 
economic threat. Secondly, German nationals who operated 
businesses and lived in the region could influence the 
political atmosphere by stirring up German patriotism and 
fascist ideology. Finally, fanatical pro-Nazi German 
nationals could carry out sabotage campaigns against Allied 
military bases and shipping. 
Prior to the outbreak of war in Europe, President 
Ro6sevelt became exceedingly concerned about the economic 
threat Germany posed to the Latin American republics. He 
wanted to ensure that they were prohibited from gaining an 
economic foothold in the region, believing that once a 
country became financially dependent upon Germany, its 
reliance upon and allegiance to the United States would 
weaken until it eventually would become a German client 
state. Throughout early 1939, Roosevelt warned the 
American public about the growing threat the Axis posed to 
the Western Hemisphere. While at the Pan-American Union in 
April 1939, President Roosevelt vowed that he would protect 
14 
the hemisphere from belligerents and "also give economic 
support, so that no American Nation need surrender any 
fraction of its sovereign freedom to maintain its economic 
welfare.u 7 Not only did this proclamation reassure the 
American public that its government would fight to preserve 
democracy in the Western hemisphere, it also served as a 
warning to Italy and Germany that the United States was 
fervently opposed to fascism. 
Understanding the need to counter German economic 
expansion, Undersecretary Sumner Welles undertook a crusade 
to align the Latin American republics behind the United 
States. Any stronger commitment to the security of Latin 
America would be political death at home. Initially, then 
Welles sought safety through hemispheric solidarity rather 
than initiating any hemispheric defensive measures that 
involved an American military commitment. 
President Roosevelt likewise perceived that military 
pacts with Latin American countries were an impossibility 
since most of Congress and the American public wanted to 
avoid any entangling alliances. Therefore, he ordered the 
State Department to work toward achieving Latin American 
7 Quoted in Irwin F. Gellman, Good Neighbor Diplomacy: 
United States Policies in Latin America, 1933-1945 
(Baltimore, 1979), 82. 
neutrality, while at the same time, pulling Latin America 
closer to the United States. 8 
15 
Of ten, Welles conspicuously displayed his concern for 
the safety of Latin America. Just a month before the 
Eighth Pan-American Conference, where he would push for 
hemispheric solidarity, Welles proclaimed 
that we are in a position to defend 
ourselves from all aggression from whatever 
source it may arise, and to be prepared to 
join with our fellow democracies of the New 
World in preserving the Western Hemisphere 
safe from any threat of attack. 9 
This statement caused many pundits to conclude that Welles 
would present a treaty for hemispheric defense at the 
conference. Welles, however, had no intention of 
attempting to create a strong alliance with the American 
Republics. He knew that an isolationist American public 
and its representatives in Washington would be cool to such 
a pact. 10 Accordingly, he ordered the American delegation 
8 This point is discussed in much greater length in 
Gellman, Good Neighbor Diplomacy, 74-92. 
9 Ibid., 74. 
10 Even though Welles had to limit the United States' 
involvement in security pacts with Latin American nations 
at the Lima Conference, he and the President used Lima as a 
first step in turning the United States toward 
internationalism. Many of President Roosevelt's speeches 
16 
to secure the acceptance of a resolution that called for 
unity of action when there was "intervention in the 
hemisphere by a non-American state."11 The resolution, 
although couched in much weaker language than a true 
defensive pact, still drew hostility from one delegate. 
Argentinean delegate Jose Maria Cantilo rejected the 
proposal and offered up his own. He called for an improved 
inter-American consultation process, an idea which had been 
suggested years earlier at the Buenos Aires conference of 
1936. Welles was pleased with the suggestion and accepted 
the proposition which obligated the foreign ministers of 
the American Republics to hold a conference if the 
hemispheric peace was imperiled. 12 Cordell Hull, on the 
other hand, found the terms of the resolution too weak, but 
finally agreed that the Declaration of Lima was as close as 
the State Department could get to a defensive pact as long 
as Argentinean opposition remained potent. 
echoed his Pan-American Union speech of 1939 and were 
intended to evoke a response from the American public which 
would favor greater involvement in foreign affairs. For an 
excellent discussion of this see, Wayne S. Cole, Roosevelt 
& the Isolationists, 1932-45 (Lincoln, 1983), 357-362. 
11 Rout and Bratzel, Shadow War, 26. 
12 Ibid. 
17 
President Roosevelt was also pleased with the 
agreement, for now he could pursue other means of securing 
the hemisphere. Prior to the Declaration of Lima, he and 
Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall had become worried 
that through the use of modern aircraft the Axis powers 
could attack Brazil by flying bombing missions across the 
Atlantic from Dakar, Senegal. 13 But with the Declaration of 
Lima concluded, President Roosevelt had an agreement that 
provided the United States with a consultative system that 
provided at least some measure of security. Even if 
Germany or Italy launched a direct attack on one of the 
American Republics, the State Department could quickly 
gather its resources to construct an effective defensive 
strategy before the situation became perilous. 
President Roosevelt also found that by arguing for 
economic solidarity in the Western hemisphere, he could 
indirectly attack Nazism and gain public support for his 
foreign policy. 14 Similarly, by convincing the American 
public that fascism threatened to spread to the Western 
13 Stanley E. Hilton, Hitler's Secret War in South 
America: German Military Espionage and Allied 
Counterespionage in Brazil, 1939-1945 (Baton Rouge, 1981), 
195; Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Education of a 
General, 1880-1939 (New York, 1963), 341. 
14 Gellman, Good Neighbor Diplomacy, 80. 
18 
hemisphere, he could more easily move America away from 
isolationism. 
But as the fascist governments in Europe expanded, the 
urgency for hemispheric unity grew. The outbreak of war in 
Europe in the fall of 1939 caused President Roosevelt and 
Undersecretary Welles to invoke the hemispheric 
consultation system that had been created in Lima for the 
first time. Welles represented the United States at the 
meeting which took place in Panama City, Panama. The 
assembly lasted a little over a week and produced sixteen 
declarations that Welles hoped would preserve peace in the 
Western Hemisphere. One of the declarations, the Pact of 
Panama, established a hemispheric neutrality belt which 
extended three hundred miles out to sea and surrounded both 
North and South America. This was President Roosevelt's 
very own design and for this reason he made sure it was 
patrolled regularly by American ships. 15 On the whole, the 
Pact of Panama did little to thwart German economic 
penetration into Latin America; however, it successfully 
moved the United States closer to internationalism and 
further away from isolationism. 
15 Robert A. Divine, The Reluctant Belligerent: 
American Entry into World War II (1965; reprint ed., New 
York, 1979), 80. 
19 
Although President Roosevelt and Undersecretary Welles 
had campaigned arduously for a greater American presence in 
Latin America, Adolf Hitler would be the man most 
responsible for turning America away from its isolationist 
stand. Soon after Germany's attack on Western Europe in 
the spring of 1940, the American public had a change of 
heart. Realizing that the Nazis were not simply interested 
Lebensraum, the desire to remain detached from the events 
in Europe turned into an impatient urge to aid the Allies 
by sending both countries many tons of material aid. 
German military successes also heightened fears in the 
White House and State Department that Hitler could be ready 
in short order to attack the American Republics. Fear of 
just such an attack prompted Roosevelt to ask his generals 
to develop a plan to counter a possible Axis invasion of 
South America. 
"Operation Pot of Gold", though a War Department 
creation, was the result of a British intelligence report 
warning that thousands of Nazi agents were sailing for 
Brazil to coordinate the overthrow of the government with 
the help of a group of sympathetic Brazilians. 16 
Fortunately, the report turned out to be false; but, the 
16 Hilton, Hitler's Secret War, 195. 
l 
20 
Roosevelt Administration continued to believe Hitler would 
seek to dominate Latin America. Soon after the "Pot of 
Gold" scare, the Roosevelt Administration took actions that 
it hoped would counter any German attempts at subversion 
south of the Rio Grande. Assistant Secretary of State 
Adolf Berle, increasingly involved in the formulation of 
policy regarding the Latin American republics, regularly 
voiced concern that nothing had been done to organize "the 
landing of 'fifth column' or other similar penetrations" in 
Latin America. 
Berle had become a highly respected member of the 
State Department staff: his colleagues as well as President 
Roosevelt sought him out because of his expert information 
gathering, a skill which eventually awarded him direct 
access to the oval office. In mid-1940 he began warning 
the chief executive and his associates in the Roosevelt 
Administration that "fifth column" activities in Latir. 
America had not been addressed. 17 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director J. 
Edgar Hoover was one of the first to act upon Berle's 
appraisals. Although the FBI had been consulting with the 
United States military on counterespionage by presidential 
17 Rout and Bratzel, Shadow War, 31. 
21 
order for almost a year, Hoover sought even more input. At 
a series of meetings beginning in late May 1940, Berle, 
Hoover, and representatives of Army G-2 met to discuss "the 
creation of an intelligence agency for action in Latin 
Arnerica". 18 Hoover clamored for control of the new agency 
and, while talks about its creation were still going on, 
sent an agent to Mexico in what became a masterful fait 
accomplis. Through this move and by using his skills at 
bureaucratic infighting, the FBI chief easily won control 
of all cloak and dagger operations in Latin America. On 
June 24, 1940 President Roosevelt directed him to establish 
the Special Intelligence Service (SIS). Hoover's plan was 
to secure the United States by wiping out the Nazi spy 
nests in Latin America. Support for Hoover's designs came 
from none other than Adolf Berle, who pledged the support 
of the American diplomatic missions in Latin Arnerica. 19 
While Hoover set about organizing his new agency, 
Berle put his hemispheric concerns down on paper. On 
September 10, 1940, he presented his colleagues with a 
document entitled German Inroads and Plans in the Other 
American Republics. In German Inroads, Berle assessed the 
18 Ibid., 34. 
19 Hilton, Hitler's Secret War, 196. 
22 
threat posed by German economic and political penetration 
in Latin America. He concluded that German espionage and 
economic advances in the region might support a pro-Axis 
government or "encourage revolutions which would emphasize 
the might . . . of Germans everywhere." 20 Berle, like other 
State Department officials, was haunted by the fact that 
thousands of German nationals lived, worked, or just passed 
through the Latin American Republics every year. He saw 
these individuals as dangerous because they carried the 
seeds of subversion. Once recruited by the Nazis, they 
would spread fascism effectively enough to take over, or at 
least, influence a Latin American government to ally with 
Germany. Although Berle's conclusions seemed valid to his 
colleagues, they were in fact based on two anomalous, 
unsubstantiated reports of pro-Nazi groups attempting to 
organize a few abortive subversive plots. 21 
Lack of evidence, however, failed to inhibit Berle's 
crusade to stop Nazi subversion in Latin America. Just 
five months later, he produced another document entitled 
The Pattern of Nazi Organization and their Activities in 
the Other American Republics. As in German Inroads, Berle 
20 Quoted in Rout and Bratzel, Shadow War, 31. 
21 Ibid. 
23 
saw economic and political subversion coming from German 
communities and firms already in the New World. Using 
little documentary evidence and possibly driven by a desire 
to increase his bureaucratic pull, the undersecretary came 
to an astounding conclusion. He claimed that "virtually 
all the Reichsdeutschen in Latin America are sincere 
supporters of the Nazi regime."22 
Patterns of Nazi Organization also contained a plan to 
counter Nazi subversion which Berle sent in secret to the 
all of the United States embassies in Latin America. In 
the plan, the embassies were told to gather information on 
any suspicious German person, group, or firm within their 
jurisdiction. The response from the embassies was 
overwhelming as lists of suspected Nazi agents and firms 
poured into the State Department. This was just the kind 
of response Berle had anticipated. It validated his 
admonitions and provided J. Edgar Hoover with the 
information he needed to eliminate German espionage. 
22 Ibid., In a study done by Leslie Rout and John 
Bratzel, Auslandsorganisation (AO) membership during 1938 
and 1940 in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico never 
surpassed 7% of the total German population of each 
country. 
24 
The State Department also ordered its missions to 
shore up support for SIS activities with governments 
throughout Latin America. For example, as early as June, 
1941, the United States ambassador to Panama, Edwin C. 
Wilson initiated a series of discussions with Panamanian 
government officials. After holding informal talks with 
several cabinet ministers, Wilson was granted his request 
to talk with Panama's President Arnulfo Arias. 23 
On June 28, 1941, Wilson, who had been informed of the 
meeting just hours before it was to take place, called on 
President Arias. After the usual pleasantries, Ambassador 
Wilson, possibly shaken by the impromptu nature of the 
meeting, abruptly inquired about security matters in and 
around the Panama Canal. He admitted that he was 
"preoccupied [with] the question of this vital area of the 
canal ... [and that] in the last war-when the United States 
23 Wilson memorandum to Hull and Welles, 30 June 1941, 
General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 
59, 711.129-711.1928/981A, National Archives II, College 
Park, MD (hereafter RG 59, followed by decimal file number, 
page number (if applicable), and location). Wilson issued 
his memorandum in report form and added at the end that he 
felt "the [State] Department must keep in mind ... that what 
has developed in Panama is about as near an approach to 
Hitlerism as the characteristics of Latin Americans and the 
peculiar circumstances affecting Panama could be expected 
to permit." 
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entered the war-Panama at once ranged itself on [the 
American] side, enemy aliens were interned and there was 
complete cooperation between the two administrations in 
defense matters." 24 
President Arias's response was quite positive. He 
agreed to remove any Germans or Italians whom the United 
States thought were dangerous to the interior of the 
country where they would have to report regularly to local 
authorities, with the provision accepted by Wilson that he 
could not deport any naturalized or temporarily naturalized 
Panamanian citizens. But before he was dismissed, Arias 
added that he wanted to avoid "anything that looked as if 
Panama was being made to trot along at the heels of the 
United States."25 Thus, the Good Neighbor policy required 
the appearance of non-intervention in Latin America: as 
long as Panama still looked independent, it would allow the 
United States to carry out counterespionage operations 
around the canal zone. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. This was an indirect referral to comments 
which had been made by officials in South American 
countries, especially Argentina, who adamantly opposed 
United States intervention in Latin American affairs. The 
Argentinean government continually rejected an alliance 
with the United States throughout World War II. 
26 
The surruner of 1941 brought a major change in America's 
foreign policy. With the threat of Axis subversion in the 
Western Hemisphere growing, a greater degree of 
intervention in Latin America was needed. On July 17, 
1941, in a press release issued by the State Department, 
President Roosevelt announced what he called "The 
Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals". The list 
consisted of persons 
deemed to be acting for the benefit of 
Germany or Italy or nationals of those 
countries and persons to whom the 
exportation directly or indirectly, of 
various articles or materials is deemed to 
be detrimental to the interest of national 
defense. 26 
Coffee plantations, restaurants, and various other 
businesses owned by Axis nationals were placed on the list 
by SIS agents, American diplomats, and officials from the 
Latin American republics. Once a business was put on the 
list, it was extremely difficult to have its name removed. 
Updated and regularly enlarged, the "Proclaimed List" was 
the most effective weapon in the economic war on the Axis 
presence in Latin America. 
26 Press release, 14 July 1941, United States 
Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1941 (Washington, 1958), 6: 269 (hereafter FRUS, 
followed by appropriate year). 
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Adolf Berle found more than a modicum of relief in the 
"Proclaimed List" policies since they implemented many 
measures to combat the Nazi subversion he had discussed in 
German Inroads. 
The "Proclaimed List" was the result of an American 
mission that had spent the last four months of 1940 
surveying "the nature and extent of the problem arising 
from the representation of American business by undesirable 
firms throughout the other American Republics." 27 The 
mission was made up of representatives of the Department of 
State and the FBI, the two government agencies most 
concerned with hemispheric security. Both agencies had 
obtained lists from "certain well-informed American 
residents recommended by the missions for such 
consultations."28 This coordinated information gathering 
effort was a major coup for both agencies and their 
leaders: The staffs of the United States embassies in Latin 
America and their SIS collaborators looked as though they 
27 Hull to Diplomatic and Consular Officers in the 
American Republics, 28 August 1941, FRUS, 1941 6:271, 273. 
In this seven section memorandum, Hull laid out the 
"Proclaimed List" system which had been created only after 
it was announced by the President on July 14. 
28 Ibid. 
were contributing to the battle against fascism, while 
Adolf Berle and J. Edgar Hoover could again stand out for 
their information gathering capabilities. 
28 
A little over a month later, Secretary of State Hull 
issued the procedures and policies for maintaining the 
"Proclaimed Listu. In the memorandum Hull outlined the 
Roosevelt Administration's plan for an attack on any pro-
Axis economic activity in Latin America. The State 
Department, in order to ensure the stability of the region, 
enlisted "the voluntary cooperation of American foreign-
trade firms in replacing agencies or sales outlets which 
appeared to be undesirable under existing conditions." 29 
In fact, American businesses benefited greatly by 
volunteering their services. From 1940 to mid-1941, 
American firms increased their imports from Latin America 
by greater than ten percent and continued to increase their 
purchases every year until the end of the war. 30 By 
replacing pro-Axis firms with American companies, the 
Roosevelt Administration boosted inter-American solidarity 
while removing any financial benefits that could go to 
Germany. However, with such a policy in place, it looked 
29 Ibid., 271-272. 
30 Gellman, Good Neighbor Diplomacy, 167. 
29 
as though America was trying to gain a monopoly on business 
in the American Republics. To dispel this criticism, the 
Administration included a disclaimer which read, "the list 
is not to be used to place the handling of American 
products solely or principally in American hands and will 
not be administered to serve selfish or acquisitive trade 
ends." 31 But the policy makers in Washington had failed to 
consider that the American Republics might attempt to 
benefit unfairly from the policy. They were not bound to 
obey directives from the State Department and could 
manipulate much of the information flowing to the American 
embassies concerning German nationals. 
In addition to the disclaimer dealing with American 
business interest, the State Department added several more. 
There was concern that the American missions might place 
persons on the list solely on the basis of nationality. As 
a result, the State Department prohibited the embassies 
from doing so but also told them to report any German, 
Italian, or Japanese nationals to their superiors in 
Washington. 32 To ambassadors and attaches these 
instructions must have seemed altogether contradictory. 
31 Hull to Diplomatic and Consular Officers in the 
American Republics, 28 August 1941, FRUS, 1941 6:276. 
32 Ibid., It is unclear what the State Department meant 
30 
Recommendations for the list had to be sent along with 
a complex series of ratings. The State Department had 
contrived a system by which the embassy staffs could 
determine whether or not an Axis national qualified for 
"blacklisting". Some of the categories used to rate 
suspects included whether or not they had children in a 
local German school or if they were a member of a German 
colony. 33 The rating system was developed from the 
information gathered by the State Department and the FBI in 
1940, following the lead of, Assistant Secretary Berle and 
FBI Director Hoover. The State Department had also been 
secretly sending funds for information gathering purposes 
to American diplomats in Latin America since the inception 
of Hoover's SIS. 34 
Subsequently, financial support was set aside for the 
construction of internment camps for Axis nationals. Just 
a day after President Roosevelt issued the Proclaimed List, 
Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Attorney General Francis 
when it asked its missions to report any German, Italian or 
Japanese national. One assumes that this did not mean that 
these individuals were to be placed on the "Procaliamed 
List" but were pointed out for possible further 
investigation. 
33 Ibid., 284-285. 
34 Hilton, Hitler's Secret War, 197. 
----- -, 
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Biddle agreed that the War Department would furnish 
"permanent custodial detention of all alien enemies 
directed interned by any authority in [the] Canal 
Zone."35 However, no action was taken at that time to begin 
building internment camps for Axis nationals in Latin 
America. 
By October 21, 1941, small tent camps had to be 
constructed at American military bases to accommodate the 
supposedly dangerous Axis nationals who had recently become 
casualties of the "Proclaimed List" policy. The Army's 
Puerto Rican Department was promptly informed by a local 
representative of the FBI that he knew of 300 male alien 
enemies who were in need of internment. However, his list 
of suspects was much longer if one included women, 
children, and subversive American citizens: all together, 
the FBI agent placed 725 persons on his list. 36 
35 E. Reybold to Marshall, 14 August 1941, General 
Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, 
212.27, microfilm copies in the George C. Marshall Library, 
Lexington, VA (hereafter RG 59, followed by decimal file 
number and location). 
36 Adjutant General's Office to the Puerto Rican 
Department, 24 October 1941, Records of the Caribbean 
Defense Command, Record Group 338, File 014.311-045, 
National Archives Branch Depository, Suitland, MD 
(hereafter RG 338, followed by decimal file number). 
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American military commanders in Latin America were 
given contingency plans as early as March 1941 containing 
instructions on the internment of "alien enemies". But 
because officials in the Roosevelt Administration were 
extremely worried that among the thousands of Jewish 
refugees corning from Europe, Hitler might include Nazi 
agents the War Department failed to exclude Jewish German 
nationals who had lived in the region for generations or 
who had recently immigrated there in flight from Nazi 
persecution in Europe. Assistant Secretary of State 
Breckinridge Long was the man in the State Department most 
alarmed by the prospect that German agents were secretly 
seeping into Latin America on boats loaded with German 
Jewish refugees. For some time, Long had been receiving 
intelligence reports f rorn the American republics that there 
were in fact refugee spies. These reports alarmed the 
Latin-American Division of the State Department so 
intensely that it began discouraging the admission of 
refugees into Central America and the Caribbean. 37 
Long had always been staunchly against admitting 
refugees into the United States or Latin America. He 
37 Henry L. Feingold, The Politics of Rescue: The 
Roosevelt Administration and the Holocaust, 1938-1945 (New 
Brunswick, 1970), 129. 
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believed that "only an infinitesimal fraction of the 
immigrants" were refugees from Hitler's tyranny and even 
went so far as saying "some are certainly German agents and 
others are sympathizers ... coming here because it is away 
f rem the scene of combat and looks like a safe place. " 38 
Long had made these comments after attending, by 
presidential request, a meeting of the McDonald Refugee 
Committee on September 4, 1941. Also in attendance were 
Rabbi Stephen Wise, President of the American Jewish 
Congress, and Joseph Rummett, Archbishop of New Orleans, 
two men the Assistant Secretary believed "hated him" and 
saw him as "the embodiment of a nemesis" because of his 
restrictionist views on immigration. 39 Long was probably 
correct to assume this, because he did serve as an obstacle 
to their mission of making immigration to the Americas 
easier for the Jews of Europe. 
Throughout the war, Rabbi Wise lobbied the State 
Department to provide a safe haven for Jews who wanted to 
escape Nazi persecution. Thus, when Panama attempted to 
enact a decree law which would include Hebrews on its 
38 Fred L. Israel, ed., The War Diary of Breckinridge 
Long: Selections from the Years, 1939-1944 (Lincoln, 1966), 
216. 
39 Ibid. 
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prohibited immigration list, he moved quickly to have it 
stopped. 40 In a letter to Assistant Secretary Welles, Wise 
expressed his concern that the new law would close yet 
another door in the face of European Jewish refugees and 
would set a precedent for other American republics to 
follow. In response, the Secretary handed the problem over 
to his most trusted colleague, Sumner Welles who asked 
ambassador Wilson to discuss the matter "at an early and 
opportune moment" with the Panamanian authorities. 
Apparently, Welles wanted to find out if the charges were 
actually true, and if they were, for Wilson to inform the 
Panamanians of "the unfortunate effect which anti-Semitic 
measures ... would produce on public opinion in the United 
States. " 41 
During the last week of September 1941, a memorandum 
assessing the projected anti-Jewish decree law was produced 
40 The initial complaint concerning the Panamanian 
decree law came in the form of a letter sent to the 
Secretary of State by an American citizen of Jewish descent 
living in New York City. see Estelle M. Sternberger to 
Cordell Hull, 20 September 1941, RG 59, 819.24/700-
819. 42/8-2444, National Archives II. A decree law is one 
promulgated by the President Roosevelt without the 
involvement of the adjourned Panamanian Parliament. 
41 Wise to Welles, 31 October 1941, RG 59, 819/700-
819. 42/8-2444, National Archives II. 
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by the State Department. Appropriately alarmist in tone, 
the document expressed significant concern that such an 
anti-Semitic measure "would be regarded as a great victory 
for Nazi ideas and would ... constitute a precedent for 
similar legislation in other American republics." 42 Not 
only did the decree law prohibit Jewish immigration, it 
also robbed all Panamanian Jews, who did not have at least 
one parent born in Panama, of their citizenship. 
Furthermore, the State Department concluded that the 
Panamanian President had been "familiarized with fascist 
practices" when he had served as a Minister to Fascist 
Italy. 
The decree law's similarity to measures adopted in 
Germany must have frightened the State Department. Not 
only did it look "Hitleresque", it could only increase the 
already unwieldy levels of Jewish immigration to the United 
States. European Jews headed for Panama would look to the 
United States for refuge, as would the recently expelled 
Panamanian Jews. Economic and personal interests were also 
among the reasons President Arias was enacting the decree 
law. By ousting Jewish business owners, he made businesses 
42 Unsigned State Department memorandum, September 
1941, RG 59, 711.129-711.1928/981A, National Archives II. 
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available for native Panamanians to purchase or for the 
Panamanian government to nationalize. 
The decree law was not the only difficulty President 
Arias had presented to the State Department. A month 
earlier, Ambassador Wilson met with Arias again to discuss 
the still unfinished problem of the Axis nationals in 
Panama. In an attempt to convince President Arias that he 
should be more concerned about them, Wilson explained that 
"in the last war Panama aligned itself with the United 
States and after consultation, which had been going on for 
some time between the authorities of Panama and the Canal 
Zone, enemy aliens were arrested by Panama and interned ... 
and later removed to the United States." 43 President Arias 
responded by agreeing to remove any Axis nationals with 
provisional citizenship to the country's interior, but he 
had not considered what he would do with those who had not 
become naturalized Panamanians. It was at this point that 
Arias changed the subject. Suddenly, he wanted to discuss 
problems with American defense site leases in Panama and 
suggested that until the lease agreements were resolved, 
43 Wilson memorandum to the State Department, 26 
September 1941, RG 59, 711.129-711.1928/981A., National 
Archives II. 
American concerns about Axis nationals in Panama would not 
appear on the negotiating table. 
However, Wilson and his superiors in the State 
Department only had to deal with Arias for another month. 
By November 22, 1941 Panama had found a new leader under 
the administration of President Ernesto de la Guardia, who 
promised American officials he would not enact any of 
Arias's anti-Semitic measures. 44 This must have been a 
relief to many in the State Department. However, after 
United States ambassador Wilson met with Panama's new 
Foreign Minister, the specter of anti-Semitism in Panama 
arose once again. The Panamanian diplomat explained to 
Edwin Wilson that although most of the Jews in Panama 
behaved admirably "a less desirable class of Jews had come 
to Panama, political refugees from Poland for the most 
part, who had through their sharp business dealings, 
incurred ill will from Panamanians." 45 Thus, even though 
the leaders had changed, anti-Semitism remained strong in 
the Panamanian government. 
As the United States entry into the war approached, 
there was little more the State Department could do to 
44 Wilson to Hull, 22 November 1941, RG 59, 819/700-
819. 42/8-2444, National Archives II. 
45 Ibid. 
37 
38 
secure the hemisphere. Sumner Welles, Adolf Berle, and 
Breckinridge Long continued to warn their superiors of the 
threat posed by enemy aliens in the American Republics. 
President Roosevelt also remained concerned that German and 
Italian nationals could easily subvert one of the typically 
unstable Latin American governments. Moreover, Axis 
nationals with financial and political influence were the 
most likely to attempt such subversion. Unfortunately, 
many of the wealthiest Germans living in the American 
republics were Jews, making them the most vulnerable to 
investigation by their adopted county's government or by 
the SIS. 
While President Roosevelt found some peace of mind in 
the Declaration of Lima, he and the State Department knew 
that when the United States entered the war, Axis nationals 
in Latin America would become even more dangerous to the 
security of the hemisphere. To abate their potency in the 
political affairs of the region, a systematic method for 
ridding the American Republics of them and the dangers they 
ostensibly represented was needed. 
CHAPTER II: SECURING LATIN AMERICA 
Almost immediately after the bombing of Pearl Harbor 
by the Japanese on December 7, 1941, eight Latin American 
nations declared war on Germany. Among the eight, Panama 
was the country of greatest concern to the Roosevelt 
Administration. Should the canal fall into enemy hands or 
be disabled, allied shipping would be severely hampered. 
To prevent such an event, officials from the State 
Department and the Republic of Panama met to discuss what 
se~urity measures could be taken in and around the canal 
zone. They came to an agreement on December 12, 1941, the 
same day the Panamanian Government declared a war on 
Germany. In order to secure the canal, the State 
Department ordered the Army to begin and carry to 
completion the construction of an internment camp for 
"Japanese and other enemy aliens" and to apprehend all 
enemy aliens in the canal zone and the Republic of Panama 
39 
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for immediate internment in the as yet unfinished camp. 1 
Throughout the war, this camp, constructed within the 
canal zone at Balboa, Panama, would be the primary holding 
area for all Axis nationals arrested in Latin America by 
the United States Army and the Latin American governments. 
Although some areas in the canal zone were ready to 
hold the Germans, Italians, and Japanese temporarily, it 
appeared that the United States Army was far from prepared 
to deal with the political uproar caused by the internment 
program. As quickly as the Army began interning enemy 
aliens, it started to release internees whose family 
members had descended upon the camp pleading for the 
discharge of their relatives. Shocked and angered by the 
Army's unilateral actions, a representative from the 
Panamanian military immediately called United States 
ambassador Wilson to exhort him. 2 Wilson then sent an 
urgent message to the commander of the Panama Canal 
1 Adarns to Caribbean Defense Command (hereafter CDC), 
12 December 1941, RG 338, 014.311-045, National Archives 
Branch Depository. 
2 Wilson to Andrews, 19 December 1941, RG 338, 
Department, Lieutenant General Frank M. Andrews, urging 
him to release only internees who had been cleared by the 
Panamanian government. Furthermore, he notified Andrews 
that "these internees, who have been arrested by the 
Panamanian police on Panamanian territory, have been 
turned over to the Canal zone authorities to hold 
temporarily until an adequate internment camp 
can be constructed." 3 The Army's practice of releasing 
the internees angered the Panamanian authorities who 
wanted the enemy aliens removed, for as long as they 
remained in Panama there was still the chance they could 
be released. However, with their quick removal the 
Panamanian government moved to take possession of their 
unattended shops and farms. 
In fact, only three months had passed since 
Ambassador Wilson had warned the Panamanian government 
that the State Department was concerned about several 
racist measures about to be enacted in Panama, including 
014.311-045, National Archives Branch Depository. 
3 Ibid. 
41 
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an effort to close 50 Jewish businesses and prohibit the 
preparation of meat according to Jewish dietary 
restrictions. Wilson had been told by President Arias 
that there were elements in the Panamanian government that 
wanted to "despoil" the Jews in Panama of their property. 4 
Although none of these measures were enforced, they showed 
that the political climate in Panama encouraged 
discrimination against the Jewish population. 
The roundup of Axis nationals was filled with 
extraordinary irony for both the Americans and the 
Panamanians. While the Panamanians rounded up Axis 
nationals at the behest of the United States, they could 
also dispose of the Jews the United States had asked them 
to quit discriminating against several months earlier. 
Furthermore, the Panamanian government could now intern 
any Axis national and confiscate their business -- using 
the "Proclaimed List" rubric -- with the full political 
and logistical support of the United States military. In 
4 Wilson to Hull, 4 October 1941, RG 59, 819.4016/12, 
National Archives II. In this memorandum, Wilson 
discusses an informal dinner conversation he had with 
the bright glare of the war, the Roosevelt Administration 
had been blinded. Its anxiety over securing the Western 
hemisphere overrode its concern for the rights of a small 
section of Panama's citizenry. 
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Panama was not the only Latin American country that 
would experience the State Department's war on Axis 
subversion. The American entry in World War II caused a 
frenzy of arrests and internments throughout the region. 
The Panama Canal Zone would become the headquarters for 
the coordination of a collaborative effort among the 
United States and many Latin American countries to rid the 
New World of Axis nationals. For the United states, 
security was the primary concern; however, for the Latin 
American Republics, the issue was mostly economic. 
Costa Rica, for example, arrested Axis nationals and, 
like Panama, had trouble keeping them in custody. On 
January 2, 1942, the Costa Rican government sent an urgent 
message to General Andrews warning him that "influential 
Costa Rican relatives of Germans ... [were] strongly 
President Arias. 
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pressing [the] President and [the] Ministers to release 
some of those arrested and unless they are immediately 
removed from this country [the] President will be 
forced to release them.us The message also implied that 
no more arrests would be made until assurance was given 
that those enemy aliens already in custody were quickly 
removed from the country by the American military. 
Embarrassed, American officials immediately responded by 
promising to remove the enemy aliens by air if necessary. 6 
The Costa Ricans were obviously less enthusiastic about 
the arrest and internment of Axis nationals than the 
United States. 
Panama, however, with an anti-Semitic agenda and the 
support of a huge United States military presence, readily 
enlisted in the program. Panama's embrace of the arrest 
and interment program is evidenced in a message sent by 
Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall to General 
5 CDC memorandum to the State Department, 2 January 
1942, RG 338, 014.31-5, National Archives Branch 
Depository. 
6 Ibid. 
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Andrews on January 18, 1942. In the message, Marshall 
informed his colleague that should he need any further 
help from the Panamanian government in securing the Canal 
Zone from enemy aliens, a conference could be called to 
discuss what measures could be taken. Marshall also told 
Andrews that he believed any requests made of the 
Panamanians "for additional cooperation in the 
accomplishment of [his] mission would be favorably 
entertained." 7 Although the Panamanian government 
continued to cooperate with American wishes that it arrest 
and intern enemy aliens, by the end of January 1942 it had 
released most but not all of its Jewish internees. 8 
Other countries also began cooperating with the 
United States and the British forces in the region by 
either allowing the allies to arrest enemy aliens within 
their borders or by handing enemy aliens over to the 
7 Marshall to Andrews, 18 January 1942, RG 59, 
212.27, George C. Marshall Library. 
8 Strum, "Jewish Internees in the American South, 
1942-1945", 32. According to Strum, twenty-nine Jews 
still remained in custody at Balboa, Panama. 
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allied forces stationed in their countries. 9 In early 
February, British officials in Trinidad had interned 
forty-two enemy aliens and divided them into two groups, 
Jewish and non-Jewish. In addition to those in British 
custody, another 291 enemy aliens were conditionally at 
liberty, most all of whom were German and Austrian Jews. 10 
By February 8, 1942 there were 132 internees in 
United States Army custody in the Canal Zone. Of the 132 
internees thirty-five were non-German and only eleven were 
German Jews. One of the German-Jewish internees, Gerhard 
Schlesinger, was listed simply as a German. In 1938, 
however, the Nazis had had little trouble uncovering 
Schlesinger's extraction. He was arrested and sent to 
Buchenwald in 1938 but released provided he leave Germany. 
After seeking exile in Poland, Schlesinger and his wife 
Charlotte were forced to flee persecution once again when 
the Nazis invaded that country in September 1939. For an 
9 CDC Trinidad Sector to Andrews, 6 February 1942, RG 
338, 014.311, National Archives Branch Depository. 
10 Ibid. 
entire year, they continued their flight east across the 
vastness of the Soviet Union to Japan, making their final 
destination the apparent safety of the Republic of 
Panama. 11 
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Another German-Jewish refugee interned in the Canal 
Zone was Frederick L. Kappel. In 1938 he too had narrowly 
escaped death at the hands of the Nazis. After he was 
ordered by the Gestapo to leave Germany, he fled to Panama 
via Denmark. 12 Both men had been apprehended in the first 
wave of arrests made by the Panamanian authorities just 
after the outbreak of the war. 
While Schlesinger and Kappel wondered what fate 
awaited them, General Andrews and Ambassador Wilson 
repeatedly urged Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson to 
order the evacuation of all the internees in the Canal 
Zone to the United States. The camp at Balboa in the 
Canal Zone had reached capacity and work on a new camp had 
stopped. By February 20, there were 110 German, 214 
11 Strum, Jewish Internees in the American South, 31. 
12 Ibid. 
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Japanese, twenty-three Italian, and thirty-four 
miscellaneous internees at Balboa. However, the most 
severe problem for the Americans was not the internees 
themselves but rather their 1821 dependents. 13 
When the State Department initiated its campaign to 
intern "dangerousu enemy aliens, it failed to anticipate 
that many would have dependents, a problem which might not 
have occurred had many of the Axis nationals been allowed 
to keep their property and businesses. Without any means 
of support, the women and children of the internees were 
forced to follow them to the camps, causing a huge refugee 
problem for the Canal Zone authorities. Their only 
alternative was to deport the internees and their families 
to the United States. 
However, there were no facilities in the United 
States capable of handling so many internees, nor were 
there any facilities suited to accorrnnodate the needs of 
women and children. The Roosevelt Administration was 
13 Andrews and Wilson memorandum to Stimson, 20 
February 1942, RG 59, 212.27, George C. Marshall Library. 
They also told Stimson that the internees were not allowed 
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already in the throws of relocating thousands of Japanese 
Americans: an influx of Axis nationals from Latin America 
would only add to their mounting frustration. 
By the end of February a permanent camp still had not 
been constructed in the Canal Zone for the 424 enemy 
aliens interned there. This concerned the Canal Zone 
authorities because the Balboa camp consisted entirely of 
tents and could be used only during the Panamanian dry 
season which ended in mid-April. 14 However, with 323 of 
the aliens slated to be transported to the United States 
for ."indefinite internment", Canal Zone authorities could 
at least breathe a little easier. In this group, ten of 
the enemy aliens listed themselves as Jews, Frederick 
Kappel and Gerhard Schlesinger among them. However, 
American officials once again had failed to list 
Schlesinger as a Jew. In fact, he was probably not the 
only one. There were at least five other internees with 
to have visitors or receive mail that was uncensored. 
14 Assistant Adjutant General's report to Andrews, 28 
February 1942, RG 338, 014.31-5. National Archives Branch 
Depository. 
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typically Jewish surnames who were simply listed as 
Austrian or German. 15 
One of the internee's family members wrote an 
emotional appeal to Army G-2 for his release. Sigismund 
Gottesman, whose final fate is unknown, was the subject of 
a heart felt appeal for release by his son-in-law, 
Frederick E. Knoh. Knoh described Gottesman as a "descent 
[sic] and honorable" man who had given "very much money" 
to people seeking "to escape the homicidal actions of 
Hitler."16 He also complained that his father-in-law had 
not been given a hearing and was unaware of the reasons 
behind his confinement. This was true: unfortunately, the 
luxury of hearings and review boards were unavailable to 
the internees for much of the war. By the end of March 
1942, the number of internees in the tent camp at Balboa 
had grown by nearly one hundred, with the new total 
15 Ibid. 
16 Knoh to Andrews, 19 March 1942, RG 338, 014.311, 
National Archives Branch Depository. 
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reaching 517. 17 
During the first two weeks of March 1942, the State 
Department and the German Government, with the Swiss 
government serving as moderator, began a series of 
discussions which would determine the fate of many of the 
internees. By month's end, American and German officials 
agreed that the "reciprocal repatriation" of the internees 
was preferable to internment. 18 Germany, which had 
initiated the talks, wanted to receive the internees in 
large scale personnel exchanges with the Allies. This 
idea found acceptance among State Department officials, 
like Sumner Welles, who were eager to relieve themselves 
of the trouble of finding facilities for the internees and 
who wanted the quick return of American citizens still in 
German occupied territory. Welles, who at the time was 
serving as Acting Secretary of State, negotiated the 
17 Assistant Adjutant General's report to Andrews, 31 
March 1942, RG 338, 014.311/383.6, National Archives 
Branch Depository. 
18 State Department to the British Embassy, 27 March 
1942, FRUS, 1942 (Washington, 1965), 1:344; Israel, The 
War Diary of Breckinridge Long, 228. 
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logistics of the exchange program. 19 
He sent the terms for the exchanges to Leland 
Harrison, United States Minister to Switzerland. In the 
ten point telegram, Welles laid out a comprehensive system 
for exchanging official and non-official German personnel 
for their Allied counterparts in German custody. Welles 
agreed "on the basis of reciprocity" to return "all non-
official European Axis nationals in the United States 
desiring to leave ... except for any individuals whose 
return may be considered prejudicial to the national 
interest" to Germany aboard the Swedish exchange vessel 
Drottningholm. The ship would be filled with "Axis career 
officials and their dependents to the extent that suitable 
accommodations are available ... and ... will then be 
filled to capacity with European Axis non-officials 
received from other American Republics." 20 The Acting 
Secretary also anticipated that a second voyage might take 
19 Ibid., 345-49. 
20 Ibid. 
place since the German Government had warned that the 
Drottningholm was not large enough to accommodate the 
entire group on a single voyage. Furthermore, it was 
agreed that all non-official personnel unable to be 
carried by the Drottningholm, would be repatriated by 
neutral commercial vessels as suggested by Germany. 
This was an ideal arrangement for the State 
Department. Its internment program was originally an 
unwanted but necessary logistic and diplomatic nightmare; 
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however, it was becoming a useful tool. Propitiously, the 
State Department had hundreds of German nationals in 
custody who were not United States citizens and therefore 
could be used in personnel exchanges with Germany. But 
for the internees, this situation posed a serious threat 
to their safety, especially those who were Jewish or 
openly opposed to Nazism. Even though Welles had stated 
that only those internees desiring repatriation would be 
returned to Europe, the possibility remained that some 
misinformation provided by an overzealous Latin American 
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Republic or an errant SIS agent could place a Jewish or an 
anti-Nazi internee in the hands of the Gestapo. 
In April 1942, with nearly thirty Jewish men and 560 
non-Jewish internees still in custody at the Balboa camp, 
the American military began the deportation-repatriation 
process that Sumner Welles had organized with the German 
government. 21 At about the same time the State Department 
started to ship internees out of Panama, American 
officials in Peru were in negotiations for the 
implementation of a similar program in that country. They 
soon found however that the Peruvians were not as 
cooperative as the Panamanians. As a result of Peru's 
uncooperative posture, the State Department issued a 
report dated April 9, 1942 and entitled, Measures Which 
Peru Might Take To Improve Its Cooperation With The United 
States. The largest section of the six-point report was 
devoted exclusively to subversive activities. 22 State 
21 Strum, Jewish Internees in the American South, 32; 
Gardiner, Pawns in a Triangle of Hate, 28. 
22 Division of the American Republics Report, 9 April 
1942, RG 59, 711.1928/984-711.25/259. National Archives II. 
55 
Department officials found the Peruvian Government "most 
unwilling to cooperate in the expulsion of dangerous Axis 
non-officials". 23 Peruvian reluctance most likely stemmed 
from the many Fascists who held positions of authority in 
the government. Apparently, the State Department had 
considered affecting their removal but acknowledged "their 
elimination would be a rather drastic check up". 24 
Nevertheless, the Peruvian government eventually agreed to 
round up its Axis-nationals in exchange for some trade 
agreements and military hardware. An enormous $29 million 
lend-lease contract as well as an agreement for the United 
States to purchase Peruvian raw materials to be used in 
war related industries constituted just part of the carrot 
that was waved in front of the Peruvian officials. In 
addition to the lend lease agreements, the United States 
also expanded the airport and placed a coastal battery at 
the port city of Talara. 25 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Gardiner, Pawns in a Triangle of Hate, 21. 
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With an American presence established in Peru and the 
deportation to the United States of the Axis-nationals who 
had been held in Panama, the State Department had 
accomplished much toward securing Latin America from Nazi 
sabotage and subversion. In the process, Sumner Welles 
discovered that from the cumbersome task of cleaning the 
undesirable elements out of the New World, the State 
Department could rescue hundreds of Americans stranded in 
Nazi occupied Europe. 
For the "enemy aliensu, however, there were few 
advantages and little hope for their futures. Although 
most of the Jewish internees had been released in January, 
several families remained in custody on their way aboard a 
United States transport ship to an uncertain fate along 
with hundreds of non-Jewish German internees. They had 
been arrested, interned, divested of their property, and 
deported for no reason other than their nationality. Many 
of the non-Jews had requested repatriation to Germany 
which to them must have seemed to be the fastest way to 
gain freedom; however, they had little choice: there was 
nothinq left for them in Latin America. 
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CHAPTER III: BRINGING THE THREAT HOME 
With the Peruvian government participating in the 
internment program, the State Department had to begin 
shipping internees back to the United States for 
safekeeping. With more arrests anticipated, room would be 
needed to house internees temporarily if camps in the 
United States were unprepared to receive them directly 
from Latin America. 
For those internees already in custody however it was 
time to begin the journey north. But before leaving Latin 
America for internment camps in the United States, they 
had to undergo yet another humiliation. At the docks, 
just prior to embarking, they were herded through 
processing. 
A sergeant in the military police, Clarence H. Bowser 
had been assigned to escort and process the internees. He 
stayed aboard the transport ships and disembarked only at 
one of those Latin American ports where internees were 
picked up. 1 Upon arriving at a Latin American port, 
1 Sergeant Clarence H. Bowser to Captain Herbert K. 
Harris, 17 October 1942, RG 338, 014.311, National 
Archives Branch Depository. Although Sergeant Bowser's 
statement was made months after the shipment of internees 
to the United States began, it serves as an excellent 
example of the methodology used by the United States 
military to process the internees. 
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Bowser and his fellow soldiers in the United States Army 
Military Police (M.P.) gave each internee a badge with a 
number on it and lined them up on the docks with their 
baggage in front of them. They then searched through their 
belongings, taking out anything that was a security risk 
even cigarettes and whisky - and placed them in unmarked 
boxes, making it impossible to identify whose possessions 
were contained inside. They then boarded the ship where 
the indignities continued. 2 
The conditions aboard the transport ships were less 
than ideal. In one instance conditions were so miserable 
that three of the internees drafted a report describing the 
inhumanities and degradations they suffered. Bernhard 
Buesken, Anna Eckstein, and Martha Zeuner were living in 
Costa Rica when they were arrested and slated for 
internment in the United States. From San Jose, they were 
taken to Puntarenas where they embarked upon the M.S. 
Puebla. 3 
2 Ibid. 
3 Bernhard Buesken, Frau Anna Eckstein, and Frau 
Martha Zeuner to unknown, 22 February 1943, RG 338, 
014.311, National Archives Branch Depository. As with 
Sergeant Bowser's account, the three internees' wrote their 
letter of complaint well after internees began to arrive in 
the United States for internment; however, their letter 
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According to the internees, they were forced to leave 
their baggage on the dock for unsupervised inspection while 
they boarded the ship. The soldiers then destroyed some of 
the luggage by breaking locks and prying open chests and 
even by dropping some of the baggage into the water. 4 
Once aboard the Puebla, the soldiers split the 
internees into two groups - the men in one and the women 
and children in another. The men were crammed into three 
small rooms at the bow of the ship - eighteen to twenty-
four per room. The soldiers gave each man only six square 
feet in which to reside throughout the journey. The women 
and children, on the other hand, stayed in more spacious 
cabins. 5 
The suffering caused by the intolerably cramped 
conditions aboard the Puebla were compounded by a delay in 
the ship's departure. For six days it sat listless, loaded 
with internees, in the humid tropical port roasting under a 
blazing sun. Furthermore, evening anti-submarine blackouts 
required that the ship's portholes remain closed, cutting 
reveals the pernicious treatment enemy aliens faced during 
captivity. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
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off what little air had been circulating through the ship. 6 
The heat and humidity were unbearable for the sick and 
pregnant women and especially their children, some of whom 
had whooping cough. 
Some women were deprived of the privilege of going out 
on deck. Also, as punishment for not keeping their cabins 
"tidy", the internees claimed that one of the ship's 
personnel intentionally dirtied the deck only to delight in 
watching the internees clean it. They also charged their 
captors with general "bullying" and failure to provide 
proper medical care. Although doctors and nurses were 
available to internees, they were not allowed direct access 
and had to submit requests for examinations to the 
soldiers. But their most serious charge was that after 
completing the voyage, four of the internees, two men and 
two women, were selected at random from the group and asked 
to sign a statement asserting that they had "no compla.ints" 
with regard to their treatment aboard the Puebla. 7 There is 
no evidence that the State or War Departments investigated 
the charges made by Buesken, Eckstein, and Zeuner. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
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However, the United States eventually repatriated all three 
along with their families to Germany in early 1944. 8 
As for the internees on the way to the United States 
from Panama, they arrived at New Orleans on April 18, 1942. 
Once again, the soldiers separated the men from the women 
and children, who were transported by rail to the 
Seagoville Detention Center in Texas. 9 
The Seagoville Detention Center was in close proximity 
to Dallas and had recently been converted from a Federal 
prison for women into a reasonably comfortable facility for 
the female internees and their children. The men, however, 
were shipped to camps that contained few if any comforts. 
After some initial confusion on the part of the INS as to 
where the male internees would be housed, it was decided 
that they would be split and sent to several different 
camps scattered throughout the southern United States: 
these camps included Camp Kenedy in Texas, Stringtown 
Internment Camp in Oklahoma and Camp Forrest in Tennessee. 10 
8 Special War Problems Division Report, 4 April 1946, 
RG 59, National Archives II. 
9 Strum, Jewish Internees in the American South, 32. 
10 Ibid., 32-33. 
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By July 1942, many of the internees from Latin America 
had been placed in the two camps located in Texas - Crystal 
City and Kenedy. However, Fred Kappel and his son Werner 
were forced to remain at the Stringtown Camp for several 
months longer. Both camps were run by the INS in a 
militaristic fashion. They contained barracks surrounded 
by barbed wire fencing and search lights with a duty of 
armed guards patrolling the grounds. The soldiers 
subjected the internees to regular roll calls and forced 
them to live as though they were prisoners of war. There 
was, however, a camp store where the internees could 
purchase cigarettes and special foods and a schedule of 
academic and vocational training in which they could 
participate voluntarily. 11 Although they were treated well 
physically, the emotional damage caused by their arrests 
for "criminal activityu and by the separation from their 
families was immense. 
The internees' only hope for release was to appeal 
through proper channels; but first they needed a spokesman. 
Dr. Fritz K. Kaul recently had earned a doctorate in law 
from the University of Berlin and had been appointed an 
assistant to the faculty there when he was forced to resign 
11 Gardiner, Pawns in a Triangle of Hate, 29-31, 59-61. 
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in 1933 as a result of the anti-Jewish laws passed by a 
newly empowered Adolf Hitler. Two years later, Kaul was 
still in Berlin practicing law when he was arrested for 
"High Treason" and sent first to Lichtenburg and then to 
Dachau concentration camps. In June 1937, Kaul was 
released on the condition that he leave Germany 
immediately. Initially, he immigrated to Columbia where he 
held several meager jobs and earned enough money to help 
his parents immigrate to Columbia to live with him. But 
soon after immigrating Kaul's parents were allowed entry 
into the United States. Kaul, on the other hand, remained 
in Latin America and moved to Panama on a temporary visa to 
work for a manufacturer. 12 
After spending a little over two years working in 
Panama, Kaul's visa was revoked by the Honduran government. 
He was deported summarily to Nicaragua where he was 
arrested on December 19, 1941 as an "enemy alien" - one of 
the hundreds of German and Japanese nationals captured 
during the mass arrests that took place in Latin America 
following the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor. 13 
12 Personal History Data Sheet, Special War Problems 
Division, 12 December 1942, RG 59, National Archives II. 
13 Ibid. 
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After examining Kaul's experience and educational 
background, there is no doubting the Camp Kenedy internees' 
decision to elect him as their spokesman. Dr. Kaul took 
his position quite seriously and immediately sent letters 
appealing for his and the other Jewish internees release to 
the Legation of Switzerland in Washington, D.C .. 14 The 
response, however, came slowly. On July 21, 1942, three 
weeks after he had mailed his initial complaint, Kaul 
received a response from the Swiss Legation. His letters 
had been turned over to the State Department and he was 
told "to corrununicate directly with the State Department for 
decision and further action". 15 Again, Dr. Kaul began 
14 The Legation of Switzerland was charged with 
overseeing the internees' well-being. Overall, they 
handled the task in a coldly bureaucratic manner. 
Displaying little concern for their charges, the Legation 
often responded to the internees' complaints for release by 
telling them to contact the State Department or other 
entities sympathetic to their plight. In October 1942, 
however, the Legation eventually approached the National 
Refugee Service (NRS) directly in hopes that it could aid 
the internees. 
15 Dr. Fritz K. Kaul to Special War Problems Division, 
24 July 1942, RG 59, National Archives II. In his letter 
Dr. Kaul argued strongly on behalf of the internees. His 
three-page letter digressed into a long legal discourse, 
which would have made any bureaucratic head spin. He 
argued on behalf of Max Kaufmann - an internee whose story 
will be told later in this paper. 
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sending correspondence to officials he hoped would 
recognize the foolishness of confining German Jews. In his 
letters to the Swiss Legation, Kaul pointed out several 
basic facts he thought might move the bureaucratic wheels 
in Washington forward. 16 He explained that none of the 
internees felt an "ounce of allegiancen to Germany and gave 
a brief summary of each of his fellow internee's recent 
history. In one of his most obvious and compelling 
arguments, he concluded that since they were Jews, they 
were no longer German citizens and therefore could have no 
formal allegiance to Germany. 17 
In Panama, Kaufmann had finally found a stable 
environment - a deserved respite after fleeing Nazism - and 
was about to be granted permission by the INS to legally 
immigrate to the United States. But before he received 
formal permission to do so, his restful life in Panama and 
future in the United States were taken from him on December 
9, 1941 when he was arrested as a "dangerousn enemy alien. 18 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Special War Problems Division, Name Files of 
Internees, RG 59, National Archives II. 
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The evidence against Kaufmann was scant at best. 
According to the authorities, Kaufmann had engaged in 
various suspicious activities. In Panama at the restaurant 
where he was employed as a waiter, a group of pro-Nazi 
Germans frequently requested that Kaufmann serve them. 
Further, an informant had seen Kaufmann delivering an 
envelope to the French Consulate and departing without it. 
In response, Kaufmann argued that he never had a group of 
Germans request him at the restaurant and that he had taken 
money to the French Consul's wife, whom he had met 
socially, for the Consul to take to his (Kaufmann's) mother 
in France. Even though there was no documentary evidence 
linking Kaufmann to any subversive activities, he was still 
interned and would remain in custody for years. 19 
Dr. Kaul's appeal was handled by the Swiss Legation in 
a typically bureaucratic fashion. Similarly, most of the 
internees' appeals either became mired in a game of, as 
Harvey Strum termed it, "passing the bucku or were simply 
ignored. Fred Kappel experienced the same kind of apathy. 
Upon arriving in the United States, he too was appointed 
spokesman for his group of nineteen Jewish men. Kappel's 
rage, however, became much more apparent, and he often 
19 Ibid. 
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expressed it in his appeals for release. In a letter to a 
lawyer in New York, Kappel cursed the young United States 
Army captain in Panama who had placed him under arrest by 
exclaiming that "[he was a] playball in the [hands of] the 
Panamanian authorities and seems to have believed ... even 
the absurdest denunciation from any damned fool." The 
enraged internee continued arguing, "that all the articles 
of the constitution were violated, we had no 
hearing ... [and], shortly said, everybody had another 
excuse, why they held us, only nobody knew and knows in 
fact, why." 2° Kappel was not the only person concerned that 
his and the other internees civil rights had been violated. 
On May 8, the Army Adjutant General's office alerted the 
corrunander of the base where Kappel and his charges were 
interned that "There is no record in this off ice of any of 
[the internees] having been accorded a hearing". 21 
Confounding Kappel's anger was the internment of his 
son Werner and one of his employees George Karliner. 
Apparently, the younger Kappel and his friend Karliner had 
2° Fred L. Kappel to Alfonse M. Spiegel, 14 April 1942, 
Name Files of Internees, Special War Problems Division, RG 
59, National Archives II. 
21 Howard F. Bresee to Colonel Bryan, 8 May 1942, RG 
407, 014.311, National Archives Branch Depository. 
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been running a secret gambling operation when the mass 
arrests of German nationals took place in Panama. In fact, 
the Panamanian authorities arrested Karliner while he was 
playing cards and, at the time, he was unable to produce 
his immigration documentation. 22 
The rage and contempt expressed by Kappel were the 
obvious result of the sense of mistrust he and the other 
internees felt toward the INS and the United States Army. 
However, their emotional pleas did not go entirely 
unnoticed. Relief organizations such as the Young Men's 
Christian Association (YMCA) and the National Refugee 
Service (NRS) assisted the internees with everyday needs 
and even helped them file their release appeals. 23 
22 Report on George Karliner, 17 January 1946, Name 
Files of Internees, Special War Problems Division, RG 59, 
National Archives II. 
23 Fritz Kaul to Legation of Switzerland, 1 November 
1942, Special War Problems Division, Name Files of 
Internees, RG 59, National Archives II; Strum, Jewish 
Internees in the American South, 28, 33-34, 37-38. In 
fact, the NRS along with the American Jewish Joint 
Distribution Committee (AJJDC) were major factors in 
obtaining the release of the internees. Both the NRS and 
the AJJDC pleaded continually with United States government 
authorities for the release of the internees. The YMCA 
ensured that the internees basic material needs were met on 
a daily basis. In the above cited letter, Kaul asked the 
Swiss Legation to inform a Mr. Fisher of the YMCA who had 
"promised him personally and verbally" to support the 
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But during the summer of 1942, the exchange program 
organized by Sumner Welles began in earnest and the 
internees appeals would have to wait. The Swedish ships 
Drottningholm and Gripsholm were chartered to transport the 
Axis officials and non-officials from ports in Latin 
America and the United States to ports in Europe and the 
Far East. By June 1942, the SS. Drottningholm had made two 
such voyages and on July 15 of that same year, left port 
with 800 non-official Axis nationals en route to Goteborg, 
Sweden. 
Although the INS had asked the internees whether or 
not they wanted to return to their homelands, the agency 
never gave any guarantees that those internees who wished 
to remain could do so until the end of the war. While 
interned at the Stringtown, Oklahoma camp and prior to his 
transfer to Camp Kenedy, Fred Kappel wrote the Swiss 
Legation about his non-Aryan descent, and his desire not to 
refugees material needs. The influence of both the NRS and 
the AJJDC are discussed in greater detail on pages 74-75 of 
this thesis. However, for a more in-depth look at the role 
these organizations played in the effort to free the 
internees one should examine the above citation of Strum's 
Jewish Internees in the American South. 
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be exchanged. 24 But letters like Kappel's must have seemed 
an exercise in futility similar to the internees' appeals 
for release: their concerns had frequently been overlooked 
by both the State Department and the Swiss Legation. 
Consequently, they remained in a state of anxiety. 
Evidence of these fears can be found among the hundreds of 
letters, like those written by Fritz Kaul and Fred Kappel, 
sent to the State Department and Swiss Legation by 
internees who were panicked by the prospect of returning to 
Germany. 25 
24 Fred Kappel to Legation of Switzerland, 26 June 
1942, Special War Problems Division, Name Files of 
Internees, RG 59, National Archives II. 
25 The numerous internees' release appeals can be found 
among the name files of enemy aliens in the Special War 
Problems Division of the State Department records located 
at the National Archives II in College Park, Maryland. 
Both Fred Kappel and Gerhard Schlesinger's stories had been 
described in summary form by Harvey Strum in his article, 
Jewish Internees in the American South. In order to better 
understand the process Strum used to make his conclusions, 
it was necessary to examine more closely Schlesinger and 
Kappel's information. However, since Kappel was an 
internee group spokesman, his file contained much more 
information than the other internees, not to mention the 
curious cicumstances of his son and George Karliner. This 
made them ideal subjects for study. The case of Fritz Kaul 
was nearly identical to Kappel's. As a group spokesman 
Kaul left a longer "paper trail" to follow. The name files 
of other internees contain standard form letters, which 
were actually appeals for release. Although important in 
After the Drottningholm had completed its three 
exchange voyages in the summer of 1942, the State 
Department did not plan any more such trips. This would 
have been welcome news to the German-Jewish internees had 
they been told; however, they heard nothing about the 
decision. 26 
Nevertheless, life in the camps continued and had 
become considerably more tolerable for the internees. 27 
Furthermore, news of their plight had reached some 
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influential people who were determined to find a way to win 
the internees' freedom. The National Refugee Service 
understanding the quantity of internees, the form letters 
failed to reveal anymore than the desire of internees to 
either remain in the United States or to be repatriated to 
Germany. 
26 List of German Nationals Deported By The Other 
American Republics Who Were Deported via the United States. 
Special War Problems Division, Subject Files, 4 June 1946, 
RG 59, Archives II. 
27 At the Kenedy and Stringtown camps, a remuneration 
program was started for some of the internees who wished to 
work. Fritz Kaul to Legation of Switzerland, 1 November 
1942, Special War Problems Division, Name Files of 
Internees, RG 59, National Archives II. 
(NRS), under the direction of Joseph Chamberlain, had 
finally become aware of the internees' situation. 28 
After arriving in the United States in April and 
suffering some indignities at the hands of pro-Nazi 
internees, Fred Kappel had appealed to the American Jewish 
Joint Distribution Committee (AJJDC) for help. The AJJDC 
succeeded in separating Kappel's group from the pro-Nazi 
group and in contacting the NRS. And soon thereafter, 
efforts of other aid organizations started to attract some 
attention. On behalf of the internees, Joseph Chamberlain 
targeted Attorney General Francis Biddle and Edward Ennis 
Director of the Justice Department's Alien Enemy Control 
Unit to free the Jewish internees, sending letters and 
requesting meetings. However, both leaders claimed that 
they did not have the authority to release them. He then 
turned to Secretary of War Stimson, who after meeting with 
Chamberlain, declined to make a determination and handed 
the issue over to the head of the Aliens Division of the 
Office of the Provost Marshal, Colonel B. Bryan. Bryan 
28 Strum, Jewish Internees in the American South, 32-
33. Months earlier, several of the internees' wives had 
reached the leader in the Jewish Welfare Board and the 
Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, Rabbi Nathan Witkin 
who became one of their most ardent advocates. 
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concluded that the Panamanian government was the only 
entity that could decide the internees' fate and proposed 
that the NRS communicate with the commanding officer of the 
CDC in Quarry Heights. 29 Although the INS had demurred on 
the question of whether to release the internees, it gave 
the married male internees a welcome Rosh Hoshana gift. 
Just before the holiday celebrating the Jewish New Year, 
nearly all of the married male internees were allowed to 
rejoin and live with their families at Seagoville. 30 The 
single men, however, remained at one of the other enemy 
alien camps maintained by the INS. 
By December 1942, concern over what to do with the 
internees continued to grow in the Army administration, 
since it had accumulated 267 more Axis nationals from Costa 
Rica, Guatemala, and San Salvador for transfer to the 
United States. Like those in Panama, officials in all 
three of the tiny central American republics were unwilling 
to hold the Axis nationals for long periods because of 
influence wielded by many of the detainees and their 
families. On December 6, the CDC informed General Marshall 
in an urgent overture: 
29 Ibid. 
30 Strum, Jewish Internees in the American South, 33-
34. 
It is understood that these countries have 
apprehended and arrested these enemy aliens 
on being urged by the United States to do 
so ... it is highly desirable to get these 
enemy aliens out of these countries as they 
will not continue to hold them. 31 
The United States Military Attache in Costa Rica was 
especially concerned that he would be placed in an 
"embarrassing" position with the Costa Rican Minister of 
Security should the enemy aliens detained there not be 
deported "now". 32 Less than a week later, Army Chief of 
Staff Marshall responded, ordering that arrangements be 
made to remove the enemy aliens from Costa Rica to the 
United States for future exchange "with interned American 
civilian nationals." 33 
Central America was not the only region in Latin 
America from which the United States was interning Axis 
nationals. Peru had been rounding up Axis nationals for 
31 Brigadier General H.C. Ingles to Marshall, 6 
December 1942, RG 338, 014.311, National Archives Branch 
Depository. 
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32 Military Attache in Costa Rica to Field Office 
Military Intelligence Service (hereafter cited as FOAMS), 5 
December 1942, RG 338, National Archives Branch Depository. 
33 Marshall to CDC, 12 December 1942, RG 338, National 
Archives Branch Depository. 
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months, and in December, had arrested 1,000 Japanese and 
250 Germans. The Peruvians previously had not exhibited 
much zeal for the internment program; however, their 
attitude changed markedly after United States officials 
promised to lease land for United States military bases 
there and purchase Peruvian raw materials. United States 
Ambassador to Peru R. Henry Norweb was pleased with this 
change in the Peruvians' attitude and called it "distinctly 
favorable for the removal of such Germans and Japanese as 
may be designated as dangerous." 34 
However, the camps back in the United States could not 
handle such large groups of internees and once again United 
States officials were faced with the possibility of another 
diplomatic embarrassment. But once Chief of Staff Marshall 
was informed, accommodations and transportation became 
available irnrnediately. 35 By February 17, CDC Commanding 
General Brett had informed the United States military 
attache in Lima that no more than 450 enemy aliens would be 
deported from the United States military outpost at Callao, 
34 Ibid.; Norweb to Ingles, 23 December 1942, RG 338, 
014.311, National Archives Branch Depository; Gardiner, 
Pawns in a Triangle of Hate, 21. 
35 Marshall to CDC, 8 January 1943, RG 338, National 
Archives Branch Depository. 
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Peru. 36 The United States transport ship Frederick Johnson 
was chartered to pick up its human cargo on February 22, 
but complications delayed the ship's departure for several 
days. The Peruvian authorities had become confused after 
receiving contradictory and often conflicting instructions 
from the United States embassy in Lima, bringing the whole 
operation to an immediate halt pending an investigation by 
a local "special agent". 37 Possibly fearing that 
misinformation had been spread by an Axis agent, the CDC 
had made a prudent move in delaying the transport ship's 
departure. In this instance, however, there was no 
counterespionage involved. A series of minor 
miscommunications had escalated into a huge 
misunderstanding. Nevertheless, the confusion was only 
temporary, and the Frederick Johnson set sail on February 
36 United States Military Attache Lima, Peru to Brett, 
17 February 1943, RG 338, National Archives Branch 
Depository. The number of enemy aliens scheduled to be 
deported out of Callao fluctuated through January and 
February, because American officials in Peru became 
worried that the Peruvians were arresting Germans and 
Japanese without proper cause. 
37 United States Military Attache Lima, Peru to Brett, 
20 February 1943, RG 338, National Archives Branch 
Depository; War Department to CDC, 21 February 1943, RG 
338, 014.311, National Archives Branch Depository. 
24, after the passenger list had been pared down to 250 
enemy aliens. 38 
While the Frederick Johnson sailed for the United 
States, the authorities back in Washington finally started 
to take a closer look at the internment program they had 
initiated just fourteen months earlier. Having already 
arrested and interned thousands of enemy aliens, a more 
exact policy was needed in order to ensure that the 
selection of enemy aliens was more focused - a reaction no 
doubt to the chaos experienced in Peru. In an attempt to 
resolve enemy alien selection problems, the War Department 
prepared a policy statement establishing guidelines for 
selection. The War Department concluded in its letter 
that: 
1) All internees will be selected or 
approved by authorized representatives of 
the United States Government designated by 
the Department of Justice and will be 
shipped to the United States 
for internment. 
2) Only ring leaders, know subversives and 
those of most suspicious character will be 
considered. 
3) No family groups will be interned. 39 
38 Brigadier General Douglas L. Weart to Marshall, 25 
February, RG 338, 014.311, National Archives Branch 
Depository. 
39 Stimson to Welles (unsigned), 24 February 1943, RG 
59, 014.311, George C. Marshall Library. 
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However, it is unclear if the policy was enacted since 
the correspondence was never signed by Secretary Stimson. 
Furthermore, enactment of the policy would have little 
effect on those already interned because nowhere in the 
letter was the release of those already in custody 
mentioned. Nevertheless, the mass arrests policy would 
have to change, especially with the Peruvian government 
arresting uncontrollably large numbers of German and 
Japanese enemy aliens at the behest of the United States. 
Apparently, American officials discovered that the 
Peruvians were careless in their selection of enemy aliens, 
possibly arresting persons who had little or no connection 
to subversive activities. The Peruvian authorities 
cooperated in order to ensure their lend-lease agreements 
with the United States would remain intact; thus, they 
needed to supply American officials with a steady stream of 
internees in order to keep up appearances. As long as it 
looked as though there were a never ending supply of Axis 
agents in Peru, the United States would continue to offer 
up goods and services to the Peruvians. 
As March came to an end, official custody of internees 
was passed from the War Department to the Department of 
Justice. In the second week of February 1943, just days 
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prior to the appearance of the War Department's policy 
letter, hearings were granted for some of the internees 
from Panama. They took place at the Algiers (Louisiana) 
Detention Center where many of the internees had been 
transferred from the camps in Texas. 40 Each internee's 
record was investigated thoroughly by Justice Department 
officials who had gone all the way to Panama to see if the 
aliens were actually who and what they claimed to be. In 
addition to a thorough background check, the internees 
signed affidavits declaring their Jewishness, loyalty to 
democratic principles, opposition to Nazism, and crime-free 
past. 41 
Fred Kappel was one of the internees granted a hearing 
in February, the outcome of which was a tremendous relief. 42 
In August, Kappel and fifty-three others, including 
Kappel's son Werner, were released as internees-at-large. 
Under their new status the internees could live as 
parolees; they were free in a sense but had to find 
40 Strum, Jewish Internees in the American South, 37. 
41 Ibid., 37-38. 
42 Department of Justice Memo, 15 September 1943, Name 
Files of Internees, Special War Problems Division, RG 59, 
National Archives II. 
sponsors near their residences in order to provide the NRS 
and INS with updates on their behavior and whereabouts. 43 
Fred and Werner Kappel were among nine fortunate 
internees who immediately found sponsorship in St. Louis, 
Missouri. Employees of the Biderman Furniture Company 
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decided to give the internees the chance to live a 
superficially normal life. 44 After a brief stay in Atlanta 
and Kansas City, Fred and Werner arrived in St. Louis. 
Although it is possible that the Kappels worked for the 
Biderman company, there means of support is not clear. 
However, Werner quickly found an unlikely employer 
considering his previous status. On December 30, 1943, he 
was inducted into the United States Army as a Private and 
sent to the 1772nd Reception Center, Jefferson Barracks, 
Missouri. The younger Kappel's friend, George Karliner 
also answered the muster. Upon release as an internee-at-
large, Karliner enlisted in the United States Navy as an 
ensign and served honorably. 45 
43 Strum, Jewish Internees in the American South, 39. 
44 Military History of Werner Kappel, 18 December 1945, 
Name Files of Internees, Special War Problems Division, RG 
59, National Archives II. 
45 Report on George Karliner, 17 January 1946, Name 
Files of Internees, Special War Problems Division, RG 59, 
National Archives II. 
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But even earlier to enlist was internee at large Max 
Kaufmann. After moving to Minnesota for a short period, 
Kaufmann joined the United States Army at Fort Snelling and 
in less than a year had been promoted to Private First 
Class. He continued to serve in the United States in non-
combat roles and was promoted to Corporal before receiving 
an honorable discharge in September 1945. 46 
But, of the three internees who enlisted, Werner 
Kappel's record deserves special notice: he was among the 
soldiers who returned with General Douglas MacArthur to the 
Philippines. On Luzon, during a bloody fight to free 
American prisoners of war from Japanese forces, Kappel took 
a serious wound. Fortunately, he survived and for his 
courage was awarded the Combat Infantryman Badge and the 
Purple Heart. While mending in an Army hospital in El 
Paso, Texas, he continued to petition for United States 
citizenship - a mission he had started upon enlisting in 
the Army. But even after his heroic contributions, Kappel 
again had to face investigations into his past. 47 
46 Biographical Information on Max Kaufmann, 5 March 
1946, Name Files of Internees, Special War Problems 
Division, RG 59, National Archives II. 
47 Military History of Werner Kappel, 18 December 
1945, Name Files of Internees, Special War Problems 
Division, RG 59, National Archives II. 
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The INS was typically indifferent, ignoring Kappel's 
military record and unwarranted internment. This brought a 
strong response in the form of letters from friends of the 
Kappels. One of the most compelling was sent by George A. 
Lubeley who had sponsored the Kappels in St. Louis. "It 
seems almost inconceivable," Lubeley argued, "that this 
boy, who has fought and bled for this country should be 
denied citizenship." 48 Letters such as Mr. Lubeley's and 
help from the Military Personnel Division of the War 
Department finally broke the bureaucratic cycle. On June 
30, 1943, while still in the hospital in El Paso recovering 
from the wounds he received in the Philippines, Private 
Kappel was given the citizenship he so obviously deserved. 
However, most of the other internees allowed to remain 
in the United States had yet to receive citizenship. And 
taking into account the difficulties Werner Kappel faced, 
they could not have expected admittance in a timely and 
straightforward fashion. Furthermore, many of the 
internees-at-large still awaiting decisions from the INS 
were too old or, for various reasons, simply unable to 
serve in the United States military an unquestionable 
mark of patriotic distinction which must have made Werner 
48 Ibid. 
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Kappel's application more attractive to the authorities. 
But there was hope for them in the friends they had made in 
the relief organization community. The AJJDC and the NRS 
would clear the morass of paperwork and claim freedom for 
the internees. 
CHAPTER IV: Conclusion 
Although the war in Europe would end in May 1945 and 
the war in the Pacific in August that same year, the 
internees still in custody continued to feel uneasy about 
their status since no attempt had been made by the United 
States government to stabilize their political situation. 
Most of the internees sought one of two solutions 
to return to the countries in which they were arrested or 
apply for United States citizenship. However, much to 
their astonishment, these options were absent from the 
list of choices offered by the State Department. 1 The 
commonly accepted outcome State Department officials 
envisaged rested on the premise that the internees would 
be shipped back to Germany in the same manner as the many 
pro-Axis internees who had been repatriated during the 
war. 2 But with Germany's infrastructure and economy in 
ruins, it was inconceivable to the War Department that 
successful repatriation was possible. Further opposition 
1 Although the State Department wanted to repatriate 
the internees, there was some speculation from Attorney 
General Biddle about returning the internees to Latin 
America. Gardiner, Pawns in a Triangle of Hate, 56-57. 
2 Strum, Jewish Internees in the American South, 40-
41. 
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to the plan came from officials in the Justice Department 
who understood that they were not empowered to force the 
aliens out of the country. 3 To circumvent this, President 
Truman issued Proclamation 2662 declaring 
All alien enemies now within the continental 
limits of the United States (1) who were 
sent here from other American republics and 
(2) who are within the territory of the 
United States without admission under the 
immigration laws are ... subject upon the 
orders of the Secretary of State to removal 
to destinations outside the limits of the 
Western Hemisphere. 4 
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But this hard-line policy was short lived as pressure 
was brought to bear upon Albert Clattenburg, Jr., Assistant 
Chief of the Special War Problems Division of the State 
Department who, by the way, had been an ardent advocate of 
the repatriation scheme. Representatives from major human 
rights organizations, such as the American Civil Liberties 
Union and the NRS, stood firmly against the wishes of 
Clattenburg and the State Department. These groups argued 
for special hearings for the internees to determine who 
could or could not remain in the United States. Finally, 
overwhelmed by the stiff political pressure from the two 
3 Ibid. 
4 Gardiner, Pawns in a Triangle of Hate, 115. 
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relief organizations, the State Department allowed hearings 
to proceed case-by-case. Although this was welcome news, 
it also made it clear that the internees would be barred 
from wholesale admittance to the United States. 5 
When sweeping changes in the internees' status did 
materialize, they were only incremental. Their parole 
supervision was lifted at the end of November 1945, and by 
March 1946, they were no longer internees-at-large. 
The final outcome came in the summer of 1953 when the 
Refugee Relief Act was passed, allowing any alien brought 
to the United States from Latin America before July 1, 
1953, to petition to change their political status to that 
of immigrant. 6 
Between July 15, 1942 and January 7, 1945, over three 
thousand German nationals from Latin America were 
repatriated via the United States. 7 And with a combined 
5 Strum, Jewish Internees in the American South, 40-
41. Although the internees in the United States were not 
released as a group, there were internees held in Canada 
who were freed in this manner. 
6 Ibid. 
7 List of German Nationals Deported By The Other 
American Republics Who Were Deported via the United States. 
Special War Problems Division, Subject Files, 4 June 1946, 
RG 59, Archives II. 
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total of 1178, Colombia and Peru lost the highest number of 
German nationals, no doubt the result of the greater 
economic intrusion by the Nazis in Colombia, and the strong 
American presence in Peru. Other countries with high 
deportation rates were Ecuador at 338, Guatemala at 380, 
Mexico at 251, Costa Rica at 234, Bolivia at 161 and Panama 
at 129. 8 But these numbers tell only part of the story. It 
should be assumed that not every German national passed 
through the United States on their way back to Europe. 
Some may have been transported directly from Latin America 
across the Atlantic to Portugal or made their way back to 
Europe in another manner. For these unofficial 
repatriations, there are no records. 
Clearly, however, the United States initiated and 
managed the program not because of anti-Semitism, as 
implied by Dateline NBC, but because it saw what appeared 
to be a genuine threat to national security. The Roosevelt 
Administration and the State Department understood that 
efforts to stop Axis intrusion in Latin America were 
necessary. Had the Nazi government maintained and 
carefully managed a professional nest of agents in the 
Western Hemisphere, who knows what mischief they could have 
8 Ibid. 
created. The opportunities to uncover Allied secrets were 
there. And in many instances, Nazi agents discovered 
valuable information on Allied shipping routes. 
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However, most of the Axis agents were ineffectual - a 
fact the Roosevelt Administration failed to discover early 
on. Similarly, the State Department failed to review its 
internee selection policies when the United States 
Ambassador was told by Panamanian officials that 
bureaucrats in the Panamanian government were plotting to 
"despoiln Jewish merchants of their businesses. These 
factors, combined with an overzealous corps of 
counterespionage agents and bureaucrats, created an 
environment of reckless disregard for the careful selection 
of possible Axis agents. Nevertheless, anti-Semitism could 
have been a factor when internees' appeals went unanswered 
for months or even years into their confinement. As was 
mentioned previously, Breckinridge Long clearly thought 
that Jews would not make ideal citizens. 
General Marshall, on the other hand, displayed no 
anti-Semitism whatsoever and could not have conceived of 
any anti-Semitic use of the internment and repatriation 
program. The program was initiated by Adolf Berle and 
Sumner Welles. With their far-reaching authority and close 
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ties to the White House, they worked with the FBI, under 
the auspices of the "Good Neighbor", to secure the 
hemisphere by helping the Latin American governments def end 
themselves from Axis subversion. For the internees who 
originally had come to the United States seeking refuge 
from the war in Europe, their road to citizenship was 
extraordinarily long and extremely difficult one. 
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